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How did a group of mothers of youngsters who had been illegally detained and later murdered 
by Argentina’s 1976-1983 dictatorship, manage to organize and protest during this period of 
severe state repression? Under what conditions would a rational individual choose to risk her 
life by engaging in collective activities subjected to the free rider problem? Combining the 
insights of a step public goods model and the encapsulated-interest theory of trust, I show that 
in spite of the high levels of uncertainty and risk involved in participation, collective action 
was possible given credible mutual commitments inherent in participation, and due to the 
provision of selective incentives to the members. These findings are confirmed by later 
developments: once a democratic transition occurred and the risk and uncertainty levels 
diminished, the group split into two different associations. 
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RACIONALIDAD, CONFIANZA Y ACCIÓN COLECTIVA: LAS MADRES DE 
PLAZA DE MAYO EN ARGENTINA.  
 
Resumen 
¿Cómo un grupo de madres de jóvenes detenidos ilegalmente y posteriormente asesinados por 
la dictadura argentina de 1976-1983, lograron organizar y protestar durante este período de 
severa represión estatal? ¿Bajo qué condiciones un individuo racional escogería arriesgar su 
vida participando en actividades colectivas sometidas al problema del polizón? Combinando 
las ideas de un modelo de provisión de bienes públicos y la teoría de la confianza del interés 
encapsulado, demuestro que a pesar de los altos niveles de incertidumbre y riesgo involucrados 
en la participación, la acción colectiva fue posible gracias a compromisos mutuos creíbles 
inherentes a la participación y debido a la provisión de incentivos selectivos de los miembros. 
Estos hallazgos son confirmados por desarrollos posteriores: una vez que se produjo una 
transición democrática y los niveles de riesgo e incertidumbre disminuyeron, el grupo se 
dividió en dos asociaciones diferentes. 
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1. Rationality, trust, and collective action 
The issue of collective action has long captured the attention of scholars across the social 
sciences and it is the central concept at stake in the case of the mobilization of the Mothers of 
Plaza de Mayo during a highly repressive regime, which is discussed in this paper. The problem 
of collective action has been studied through two major analytical traditions: public goods and 
game theory (originally the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hardin 1971). In regard to the latter, we know 
from the folk theorem that when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one, equilibria with 
cooperation are reachable in infinitely iterated n-Prisoner’s Dilemma, a result that is also 
supported by experimental data (first shown by Axelrod’s simulated tournaments).2  
From the perspective of public goods analysis, Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action 
(1965) re-framed the debate on interest group dynamics. He questioned the rationale for the 
formation of groups with collective goals since it implies non-excludability of non-contributors 
and thus offers incentives for free-riding. In the author’s account, whenever the net gains from 
participating are non-positive for all individuals, the group is latent and will not coordinate. 
Latency, in turn, is tightly linked to group size. Self-interested individuals in larger groups are 
more likely to fail to act in their common interest for three reasons. First, whenever the 
collective good is subject to crowding (or rivalry of consumption) the rewards of participation 
decline as size increases; second, the costs are likely to rise as the number of people to be 
coordinated increases; and third, the larger the group, the more likely it is to be latent (Hardin 
1982). 
However, we often observe large successful groups. In explaining coordination in some 
otherwise latent groups, Olson invokes the presence of any of the following: (1) entrepreneurs 
with gains to be made by working on the provision of collective goods, (2) rewards available 
to members only, and (3) non-rational considerations. Olson’s main contribution has received 
extended attention and criticism. The idea of selective incentives has been questioned [see 
Oliver (1980), Hardin (1982), Elster (1988)]; a main criticism is due to its time inconsistency 
when considering empirics: selective incentives are generally a product of the success of the 
group and not its cause, which leaves unexplained the issue of why a group is able to coordinate 
in the first place. A similar argument challenges the explanatory power of the presence of 
entrepreneurs. Finally, non-rational (i.e. moral) considerations have been used widely, notably 
in voting models attempting to account for voter turnout through the inclusion of a “duty term” 
(see Riker and Ordeshook 1967). Chamberlin (1974) is among the first critics who pointed out 
that Olson’s results were reversed if the collective good is non-rival, which is, if consumption 
by others does not affect an individual’s consumption then large groups are more effective in 
providing a collective good. Olson’s and Chamberlin’s results have been weakened by later 
findings. Motivated by compelling examples that state the empirical regularity that small 
groups often attempt to grow their membership in order to achieve their policy goals and that 
they never break up to become more powerful, Esteban and Ray (2001) show that when 
marginal costs rise quickly relative to contributions, the win probability of large groups is 
higher than that of small ones. 
Under what conditions is it rational to contribute towards the provision of a public good? 
Specifically, how are payoffs altered when players are in a situation of extreme risk as the 
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo were? A game theory model may explain a cooperative result but 
by definition cannot account for the reasons why cooperative players expect to be reciprocated 
                                                     
2 The experimental literature has provided useful information in an attempt to reconcile theoretical predictions and 
actual outcomes (see Holt and Laury 1997 for a review).   
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in order to achieve the collective goal. In order to explain cooperative expectations we need to 
resort to the literature on trust. What is the relationship between cooperation and trust? More 
specifically, do we need to trust those whom we engage in cooperation with? Game theory 
models only capture this feature of human interaction through iterating a game. However, trust 
may certainly induce cooperation. A growing strand of literature studies trust relations among 
individuals. There are broadly two standard theories that conceive trust as a rational decision: 
those based on the richness of social relations and the encapsulated-interest account. The first 
view focuses on the expectation of reciprocal cooperation given the possibility of repeated 
interaction in the future, shared interests and values, and common past experiences (see, for 
example, Hawthorn 1988, Williams 1988, Warren 1999). The idea is that there is some general 
predisposition to collaborate with others: “[...] in general, people will not trust others enough 
in order to bring about cooperation unless their assurance is to some extent well based; that is 
to say, unless people are also in general motivated, one way or another, not to defect if they are 
in a dependent position.” (Williams 1998:8). Note that in this definition, there is a requirement 
for a predisposition to collaborate that is not specific to a relationship in particular, but a shared 
mood or predisposition to cooperate with peers, presumably in a specific group. 
According to the encapsulated-interest theory of trust, developed by Hardin, “[...] what it 
is rational (in one’s interests) to do depends on who one is in the sense that it depends on what 
knowledge one has (1995:17).” In this view, individual’s rational decisions are to a great extent 
a product of the information, social/other experiences and beliefs he has, and it represents a 
constraint on the set of choices perceived as available. Furthermore, trust is essentially rational, 
a cognitive notion that typically involves risk: “[...] I trust you because your interest 
encapsulates mine, which is to say that you have an interest in fulfilling my trust. It is this fact 
that makes my trust more than merely expectations about your behaviour. Any expectations I 
have are grounded in an understanding (perhaps mistaken) of your interests specifically with 
respect to me.” (Hardin 2002: 3). Note that in the encapsulated interest account what matters is 
the existence of credible mutual commitments3 between the partners in a trust relation that binds 
them to trust each other. 
This paper contributes with the analysis of a case study –the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo´s 
ability to mobilize under state terror - that allows us to trace the approach of trust as rationality 
in combination with a standard game theory model of public goods provision. Testing for the 
encapsulated-interest and the thick-relationship theories is futile in laboratory settings assessing 
how players play a cooperation, given that participants do not know each other (Hardin 2003). 
Hence, an advantage of employing a case study resides in the possibility to factor context into 
the analysis. I contend that the encapsulated-interest theory of trust, under conditions of 
immense risk, explains cooperation. Additional proof of this fact is that, as will be shown, once 
the risk level diminished, cooperation ceased. 
The case study to be analyzed is the humanitarian advocacy group named Mothers of Plaza 
de Mayo, which emerged under a highly repressive regime in Argentina and survived the 
dictatorship. I contend that the extreme conditions of risk and uncertainty under which the 
interaction in this case took place allowed for collective action to actually occur. Additionally, 
because the players in the game did not know each other, the case offers the opportunity to 
empirically assess the theories of trust based on thick relationship versus encapsulated interest, 
the latter modelled as a single step public goods model. The relevance of this case resides in 
the fact that costs were considerably high: Why would anybody risk her life by participating? 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides context about the issues at stake in the case 
                                                     3  Applied at the institutional level, Sanchez-Cuenca (1998) understands a credible commitment as a manipulation of one’s set of alternatives.  
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of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo. Section 3 presents an account of the costs and benefits faced 
by the players. In Section 4, I develop a single step public goods model and briefly investigate 
the effects of modifications in the cost of participation on the incentive structure. Section 5 
explains how trust is built among group members drawing on the encapsulated interest theory 
of trust. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo 
Argentina experienced the highest number of transitions to dictatorship in the world in the 
period 1945-1990.4 The most repressive of all its dictatorial regimes began on March 24th of 
1976 and was known as the “Process of National Reorganization.” When the military took over 
power, there was widespread support for the move among the population. Indeed, President 
Maria Estela Martinez de Peron, who governed the country from mid-1974 to the beginning of 
1976, led a government characterized for weak public management. Under her rule, the Anti-
Communist Argentinean Alliance (AAA) was created and it secretly operated as the instrument 
of state terrorism against the left wing of Peronism, a working class based political party 
founded by General Peron. These were the circumstances under which, claiming the need to 
bring order to the disastrous state in which the Peron administration had put the country, a 
military junta overthrew President Martinez de Peron and appointed General Videla as the new 
de facto head of state. 
The “Process of National Reorganization” introduced the most violent period of state terror 
in Argentina’s history. The mode of operation of the groups of terror consisted in kidnapping, 
torturing and murdering individuals who were suspected to oppose the military regime. Many 
of the victims were young students thought to be linked to the Peronist Youth or to Communist 
parties, although in many cases there was no relation between the victim and any political 
organization at all.5 As a result of the violence, estimates indicate that around 30,000 people 
disappeared during those years presumably held in one of the estimated 340 clandestine 
detention centers (Fisher 1989: 62).  
The Mothers of Plaza de Mayo are the mothers of those Argentineans who disappeared 
mainly during the Process of National Reorganization, but also by the action of the AAA. The 
testimonies compiled by the agency that later investigated the disappearances (CONADEP) 
show that the groups of operations would sometimes act in a violent fashion at the moment of 
the detention, accuse the to-be disappeared of subversive, or just claim politely that she would 
be taken only for a couple of hours for interrogation. Information at the time of the detention 
was thus misleading; only in time it became clear what the real situation was. 
While queuing at the Ministry of Interior, at Police headquarters, at human rights 
organizations, at churches, and several other institutions, a group of mothers began to recognize 
each other’s faces. Eventually, in April 1977, Azucena Villaflor de Vincenti, who later became 
the first president of the organization, suggested that they all met at the Plaza de Mayo in 
Buenos Aires. The idea was that, being more than one, Videla [the de facto chief executive] 
would have to meet with them (Madres Linea Fundadora web site – MFL in references). 
Although the choice of the Plaza de Mayo could be interpreted as a symbol of freedom (it is a 
public forum where, historically, people would gather to discuss their views, Mellibovsky 
1990), it also has an instrumental value. Its location (in front of the Pink House, the offices of 
                                                     
4 See Przeworski et al. (2000).  
5 It was enough that a person’s name was listed in a “suspect’s” telephone agenda to be a target for the repression. 
(CONADEP 1997).  
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the executive power of Argentina) allows for the maximization of the chances to contact key 
government officials, and being a crowded area, it facilitated the dissemination of the mother’s 
claims.6 The next section discusses the incentive scheme faced by each mother in deciding 
whether to participate in the group’s activities. 
Spontaneity seems to have been the pattern in the first steps the mothers took. The 
marching around the Pyramid at the Plaza was not intended: at first, the mothers gathered in a 
bench at the Plaza, but the police forced them to move, alleging that under state of emergency 
meetings of more than two people were not allowed. That was how they started to walk in pairs, 
holding arms, around the Pyramid. Even the characteristic piece of white cloth that the mothers 
wear in their heads was accidental. When deciding to go to a crowded march to the Virgin of 
Lujan, they were wondering how they would recognize each other. They decided to use white 
cloth-nappies, which they all kept as a memory from the times their children were babies. 
The first 14 women that went to the Plaza the first time did not know each other, but shared 
similar concerns. As Hebe de Bonafide, President of the Asociación Plaza de Mayo, puts it: 
“The Mothers were created because (…) we were equal; our children had been taken, we were 
all going through the same, we had all been to the same places. And it was like there was no 
distance between us. That is why the Plaza grouped us. That is why the Plaza consolidated us.” 
(Hebe de Bonafini in AMPM 1995:7, my translation) In the compilation of testimonies by 
Mellibovsky (1990), one of the mothers expresses how hard it was for her to decide to go to the 
Plaza. She would think that she would not go again due to the physical insecurity that it 
involved, but the next Thursday she could not resist to go. She further asserts that “I even 
realized very soon that between the women [at the Plaza] we told each other things that we 
would not even tell our husbands. Well, the first rounds at the Plaza had that appeal but at the 
same time they were intriguing: the consciousness that we had to come back and the fear.” 
(Mellibovsky 1990: 104) 
From the perspective of new members, once the group was consolidated, some questions 
arose at the time of assessing whether to participate in group activities. Questions such as: do 
these women demand anything in particular to members? A mother’s testimony reveals that 
when she managed to approach the group, the only thing she was asked was who had 
“disappeared” in her family. Liliana recalls: “I felt that we were all the same person, I felt that 
I had found a place from where to fight.” (Muñoz and Portillo 1986).  
In summary, the mothers met by chance and perceived themselves as equals in their 
concerns. But, why would any of them risk her live in going to the Plaza? What were the 
relations between risk, uncertainty, cost and benefits that allowed for such a rational choice? 
Was it rational to make such a decision at all? The next section addresses these questions. 
 
3. Costs and benefits of cooperation 
Let us first concentrate on selective incentives, that is, the excludable benefits derived from 
group membership. First, consider the “solidary benefit” involved in participation. As 
mentioned above, the group of women that went to the Plaza the first time did not know each 
other in depth but shared concerns for the whereabouts of their children. The fear of the state’s 
potential retaliation made it valuable for the Mothers to develop a network in which they could 
interact socially. Indeed, the regime had done a good job in advertising its crusade against the 
                                                     
6 In time, many more mothers joined them. Ever since 1977, the mothers have gathered at the Plaza every 
Thursday, claiming that justice be made in regard to the “disappeared.”  
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“terrorists”7 and there was the belief that if somebody “disappeared” he or she must have been 
involved in terrorist activities. Nevertheless, as was later confirmed, many of the “disappeared” 
had no relation with any armed dissident group. In many senses, those looking for their loved 
ones were actually excluded from their groups because of having a “disappeared” in the family. 
In some cases, friends of a lifetime refused to help in the task of finding out about the 
whereabouts of disappeared relatives (Mellibovsky 1990:115). During this period a social 
phenomenon informally known as “the culture of ‘no te metas’” which means, “do not 
interfere” developed in Argentina. It refers to the fact that potential witnesses of abuses 
perpetrated by the state were better off by ignoring it than by taking active sides on it. A witness 
of a kidnapping reports the following: “[...] With a great deal of violence, they were taking the 
boy away. I turned off the light, and peeked through a tiny opening in the curtain. ‘I’ll be safer 
in the dark,’ I thought.” (Feitlowitz 1998: 89-90). For these reasons, it seems that those 
individuals who were in the search of their relatives were victims, to some extent, of social 
exclusion. In the words of Hebe de Bonafini, “[...] in those days we were looked down to, our 
families became the families of the “terrorists,” doors were closed to us, we could talk to very 
few people” (in AMPM 1998:7, my translation). 
Second, consider the “purposive benefit” derived from having done something for the 
missing children. Renee Epelbaum’s words reveal her belief that she had to do something about 
the situation: “[...] Because at the moment that everyone was terrified we overcame this fear. It 
wasn’t that we weren’t afraid. We were, but we overcame it, because of our obligation (to our 
children) and our desperation” (Muñoz and Portillo 1986). Third, the group was a valuable 
source of information. While the individual search did not stop with membership, the weekly 
meetings served as sources of more effective technologies of searching for the missing children. 
The non-excludable benefit that the group provided was to bring the issue to the public 
light, in particular, to the international community. Indeed, media censorship resulted in no 
local coverage on the issue of the “disappeared.” Besides, major domestic newspapers Clarin, 
La Nación and La Prensa had joined with the government to form Papel Prensa, which 
regulated the flow of paper for all publications.8 Then, it was in the economic interest of major 
written media enterprises to sustain the government regardless of the level of media censorship. 
As a result, only foreign media discussed information on state repression (Knudson 1997), thus 
leaving the national public unaware of either the existence of the phenomenon or its extent. 
Let us now look at the costs. First, we will refer to the risk of being punished by the military 
regime. Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights – who visited Argentina 
during the “Process of National Reorganization” in order to investigate human rights violations-
, clearly stated the risks involved in protesting: “[...] I heard about the women of Plaza de Mayo. 
And they were essential to see in a situation in which you have a government [...] trying in 
every way to terrorize the population, somebody in the place has to have the courage to risk 
everything: life, property, work, and say: no, this is wrong.” (in Susana Muñoz and Lourdes 
Portillo 1986). Once an individual decides to participate in a potentially more effective way of 
looking for her relatives than doing it alone, she accepts to take more risks than she would face 
looking on her own. Although it was more effective to proceed with the demands as a group, it 
implied extra exposure.  
                                                     
7 According to Fuster, the government hired the firm “Burston & Marsteller” to launch a campaign to improve the 
image of the country. When the country hosted the Soccer World Cup in 1978, the slogan disseminated was: 
“Argentineans are of rights and human” (Fuster 2001). 
8 Source: Jorge Lanata, Letter to Committee for the Protection of Journalists, September 8, 1993 ; cited in Knudson 
(1997: 100).  
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The protests of the Mothers in times of state repression and the strategies that they 
employed to protect themselves caused them to be known as the “Mad Women of Plaza de 
Mayo.” For example, when the police took the ID from one of them at Plaza de Mayo, all the 
others would submit theirs too, making it unmanageable for the policeman to deal with over 
300 IDs. In another story, at the time when U.S. official Terence Todman visited Argentina, the 
mothers took the opportunity to express their concerns at the Plaza, a reason for which the 
government sent soldiers who aimed their guns at the mothers. The mothers, holding each 
other’s arms, shouted: “fire,” and thus captured the attention of the journalists that were there 
to see Todman. Another example of this type of behaviour was observed with regard to arrests. 
Regularly, as the mothers refused to leave the Plaza, they would be taken to the police station. 
But then, if one mother was taken, all of them asked to go with her. If the police did not have 
enough cars, then they would show up at the police station were the other mothers were held 
and requested to be detained as well (AMPM 1995: 9-20). 
In conclusion, the mothers enjoyed benefits from organizing as a group. But such 
organization implied facing greater risks and was therefore costly. Then, why would any of 
them risk her life by gathering at the Plaza? What were the relations between costs and benefits 
of membership that allowed for such a choice? The next section attempts to formalize an answer 
to these questions. 
 
4. A simple model 
4.1. The setup 
I model the situation described above as a step-level public goods game. This section 
follows Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), with the difference -in terms of modelling- that I am 
incorporating selective incentives in an application to this case. The players are i ∈ M = 
{1,...,M}. M represents the number of mothers of those disappeared during the repression, 
which I assume to be a positive constant.9 Each player i decides whether to participate or not in 
the group activities. The representative mother’s strategy space is given by SiM = {Participate, 
Not Participate}. If a player decides not to participate in group activities, she gets a payoff equal 
to 0, which is her reservation payoff. The cost of joining the group, which involves risking 
personal physical security given that the government always represses, is denoted by c. 
The group provides two types of public goods: non-excludable -from which “d” utils are 
derived- and excludable - which provides (s(i,p,o) utils); d refers to the salience that the group 
is able to provide to the issue which we assume to be equal to 1. In turn, s(i,p,o) = i + p + o 
where i (i > 0) stands for the utility derived from gaining access to information, p (p > 0) stands 
for the utility derived from the “purposive benefit” and o (o > 0) stands for the utils that each 
mother derives from the “solidary benefit.”10 From now on, I will refer to s(i,p,o) as s only. 
Since the salience that the issue adopted both domestically and internationally was decisive to 
trigger the official inquiries about the whereabouts of the disappeared and the trials of military 
men, d > s. The provision of the public good depends on the fact that the number of players 
participating (Mp) reaches a threshold τ. The payoffs are as follows:  
                                                     
9 The number of disappeared is estimated to be of 30,000.  
10 This imposes a strong restriction, that is, that neither the salience of the issue nor the information is independent 
of the number of participants. I am treating this as binary; in the former case, whether the issue is made public or 
not and in the latter, whether the mothers have access to information (no matter how much) or not.  
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   If Mp < τ and si = Participate, i receives −c 
   If Mp < τ and si = Not participate, i receives 0 
   If Mp ≥ τ and si = Participate, i receives (d + s) − c 
   If Mp ≥ τ and si = Not Participate, i receives d 
   with d,s,c > 0 , d = 1 > s and (d + s) − c > 0. 
 
4.2. Equilibrium analysis 
Let us analyze the equilibrium of this game in pure strategies. If τ = 1, that is, if the 
participation of one player enables the provision of the public goods then there is an equilibrium 
in which one player participates and pays the cost c while M − 1 players free-ride. The player 
contributing has no incentives to deviate, because if he did he would receive a payoff of 0 
instead of [(1 + s) − c] > 0 which he receives when contributing. If τ > 1, there are (𝑀𝑀
𝜏𝜏
) equilibria 
with τ players paying the cost c while M −τ players do not participate. There is also an inefficient 
Nash equilibrium in which nobody contributes. 
Consider the equilibrium analysis in mixed strategies. As in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), 
I divide the players into three categories: mixers (x ∈ X), those that participate (referred to as 
“ppate”) in pure strategies (p ∈ P) and those that do not (n ∈ N). Thus, M = X + P + N. Note 
that I will impose symmetry: any member of X participates with probability σ. I refer to the 
number of mixers that participate as xp and to those that participate other than individual i as 
xp∼i. 
The expected payoff of participating (“ppate”), 𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝], is given by: 
Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}(1 + s − c) + Pr{xp∼i < τ − p − 1}(−c) 
= Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}(1 + s − c) + (1 − Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1})(−c) 
= Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}(1 + s)−Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}c−c+Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}c 
= Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}(1 + s) − c 
The expected payoff of not participating (“notppate”), 𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝],  is: 
Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p}1 + Pr{xp∼i < τ − p}0 = Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p} 
For the members of X, the equilibrium condition requires that 𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝]. 
Then, 
Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p}  = Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}(1 + s) − c 
and c equals 
 c = Pr {xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}1 + Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}s − Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p} 
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 c = Pr {xp∼i = τ − p − 1} + Pr{xp∼i ≥ τ − p − 1}s 
𝑐𝑐 = (
𝑀𝑀 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑛𝑛 − 1
𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝 − 1
) 𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝−1(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝜏𝜏−𝑛𝑛
+ ( ∑ ((
𝑀𝑀 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑛𝑛 − 1
𝐿𝐿
) 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 (1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝑝𝑝−𝑛𝑛−1−𝐿𝐿)
𝐿𝐿−𝑀𝑀−𝑝𝑝−𝑛𝑛−1
𝐿𝐿=𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝−1
) 𝑠𝑠 
 
For the members of P: 
 
𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛] ≤ 𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛] 
 
Pr{xp ≥ τ − p + 1} ≤ Pr{xp ≥ τ − p}(1 + s) – c 
thus, 
 c ≤ Pr{xp ≥ τ − p}1 + Pr{xp ≥ τ − p}s − Pr{xp ≥ τ − p 
+ 1}  
   c ≤ Pr{xp = τ − p} + Pr{xp ≥ τ − p}s 
   𝑐𝑐 ≤ (𝑀𝑀−𝑝𝑝−𝑛𝑛
𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝
) 𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝜏𝜏−𝑛𝑛 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝}𝑠𝑠 
𝑐𝑐 ≤ (
𝑀𝑀 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑛𝑛
𝜏𝜏 − 1
) 𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝜏𝜏−𝑛𝑛 + ( ∑ ((
𝑀𝑀 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑛𝑛
𝐿𝐿
) 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝑝𝑝−𝑛𝑛−𝐿𝐿)
𝐿𝐿=𝑀𝑀−𝑝𝑝−𝑛𝑛
𝐿𝐿=𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝
) 𝑠𝑠 
 
For the members of N: 
𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛] ≥ 𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖∈𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛] 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝} ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝 − 1}(1 + 𝑠𝑠) − 𝑐𝑐 
 
therefore, 
 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝 − 1}1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝 − 1}𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝~𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝} 
c ≥ Pr{xp = τ − p − 1} + Pr{xp ≥ τ − p − 1}s 
 𝑐𝑐 ≥ (𝑀𝑀−𝑝𝑝−𝑛𝑛
𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝−1
) 𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝−1(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝜏𝜏−𝑛𝑛+1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝 − 1}𝑠𝑠 
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𝑐𝑐 ≥ (
𝑀𝑀 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑛𝑛
𝜏𝜏 − 𝑝𝑝 − 1
) 𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝−1(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝜏𝜏−𝑛𝑛+1
+ ( ∑ ((
𝑀𝑀 − 𝑝𝑝 − 𝑛𝑛
𝐿𝐿
) 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝑝𝑝−𝑛𝑛−𝐿𝐿)
𝐿𝐿=𝑀𝑀−𝑝𝑝−𝑛𝑛
𝐿𝐿=𝜏𝜏−𝑝𝑝−1
) 𝑠𝑠 
The triples of the type (p∗, n∗, σ∗) that satisfy the above three conditions constitute Nash 
equilibria. Consider equilibria of the type (0,0, σ). Thus, every player participates with 
probability σ and the equilibrium condition becomes: 
 
𝑐𝑐 = (
𝑀𝑀 − 1
𝜏𝜏 − 1
) 𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏−1(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝜏𝜏 + ( ∑ ((
𝑀𝑀 − 1
𝐿𝐿
) 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−1−𝐿𝐿)
𝐿𝐿=𝑀𝑀−1
𝐿𝐿=𝜏𝜏−1
) 𝑠𝑠 
 
Multiple equilibria result. In Table 1, I simulate values of M, τ, σ, and s in order to obtain 
c. Let us assume M = 1,000 (which we could hypothesize as the number of mothers actively 
inquiring about the whereabouts of their offspring) and τ = 300 (as in the example described in 
Section 3). Let us recall that τ is the number of participants required to provide the public good. 
We have empirical information that allows us to make a reasonable assumption about the values 
of M and τ, but we remain uncertain about the values of σ (the probability that an individual 
participates in group activities), and s (benefits derived from group membership).  
From this exercise, we learned that for those values of M and τ, the expression     
(∑ (𝑀𝑀−1
𝐿𝐿
)𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−1−𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿=𝑀𝑀−1𝐿𝐿=𝜏𝜏−1 ) approaches 1 as σ gets closer to 0.4. On the other hand, since 
(𝑀𝑀−1
𝜏𝜏−1
)𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏−1(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝜏𝜏 → 0, the value of c is defined by s for σ ∈ [0.4,1). Thus, as σ goes up, c 
goes up, growing fastest in the interval [0.2,0.3].  
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Table 1: Simulated values of c for the indicated values of σ and s that satisfy the equilibrium 
condition. M = 1,000 and τ = 300. 
σ s c  σ s c  σ s c 
0.2 0.1 2.98825E-14  0.31 0.9 0.720775404  0.35 0.7 0.699874973 
0.2 0.3 4.1367E-14  0.32 0.1 0.102704727  0.35 0.9 0.899815073 
0.2 0.5 5.28515E-14  0.32 0.3 0.287748756  0.4 0.1 0.1 
0.2 0.7 6.4336E-14  0.32 0.5 0.472792784  0.4 0.5 0.5 
0.2 0.9 7.58205E-14  0.32 0.7 0.657836812  0.4 0.9 0.9 
0.3 0.1 0.080640222  0.32 0.9 0.84288084  0.5 0.1 0.1 
0.3 0.3 0.18687866  0.34 0.1 0.100361567  0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.3 0.5 0.293117097  0.34 0.3 0.299808962  0.5 0.9 0.9 
0.3 0.7 0.399355534  0.34 0.5 0.499256357  0.7 0.1 0.1 
0.3 0.9 0.505593972  0.34 0.7 0.698703752  0.7 0.5 0.5 
0.31 0.1 0.098798946  0.34 0.9 0.898151147  0.7 0.9 0.9 
0.31 0.3 0.254293061  0.35 0.1 0.100054671  0.9 0.1 0.9 
0.31 0.5 0.409787175  0.35 0.3 0.299994771  0.9 0.5 0.1 
0.31 0.7 0.565281289  0.35 0.5 0.499934872  0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of c as σ increases from 0.2 to 0.9 for the indicated fixed 
values of s. The graphs tie the different levels of the cost of joining the group with the 
probability that any individual will join given fixed levels of benefits from group membership 
(from low (s=0.1) to high (s= 0.9)) with M fixed at 1,000 and τ =300 as assumed above. As we 
observe, c reaches its maximum after somewhere between 0.3 and 0.4 in the x axis (where we 
measure σ), regardless of the value of s. 
The implications of the simulation for our analysis of mixed strategy equilibria of the type 
(0,0, σ) are straightforward. Given M = 1,000 and τ = 300, once the probability of participation 
reaches the neighbourhood of 0.4 and thereafter, selective incentives are equal to the cost (s = 
c) for the equilibrium condition to hold. Overall, as expected, collective action is supported 
both in pure strategies and in mixed strategies when we include selective incentives in the game. 
This is also true when there are no selective incentives (i.e., when s = 0). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the cost of joining the group 
 
 
  
I explored a case in which τ = 100 and M = 1,000 as before (table not shown). I found that 
since (𝑀𝑀−1
𝜏𝜏−1
)𝜎𝜎𝜏𝜏−1(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−𝜏𝜏 → 0  as 𝜎𝜎 increases and in turn 
 
( ∑ ((
𝑀𝑀 − 1
𝐿𝐿
) 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝑀𝑀−1−𝐿𝐿)
𝐿𝐿=𝑀𝑀−1
𝐿𝐿=𝜏𝜏−1
) 𝑠𝑠 = 1 
 
for any values of s and σ, then the value of c in the equation for the equilibrium condition is 
driven by the value of s. 
What would happen, in mixed strategies equilibria, if more women were needed at the 
Plaza in order to produce the public good? Table 2 shows the impact on the relevant variables 
when, ceteris paribus, τ = 500 (see table below). For any given value of the benefits derived 
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from group membership (s), the risk of suffering government repression (c) increases as the 
probability that the Mothers who mix strategies participate (σ) increases. Comparing Tables I 
and II, we observe that as the threshold (τ) increases the equilibrium conditions are satisfied 
with a positive correlation between selective incentives and costs. When the minimum number 
of participants required to provide group benefits increases from 300 to 500, the benefits to 
those mothers participating in group activities augment as the individual risks faced by those 
individuals who join the Mothers increase. 
Table 2: Simulated values of c for the indicated values of σ and s that satisfy the equilibrium 
condition. M = 1,000 and τ = 500. 
Σ s C  σ s c  Σ s c 
0.2 0.1 7.69E-98  0.31 0.9 1.46142E-35  0.35 0.7 2.99828E-22 
0.2 0.3 2.30668E-97  0.32 0.1 3.3886E-32  0.35 0.9 3.51345E-22 
0.2 0.5 3.84447E-97  0.32 0.3 4.46255E-32  0.4 0.1 5.58215E-11 
0.2 0.7 5.38226E-97  0.32 0.5 5.5365E-32  0.4 0.5 1.06755E-10 
0.2 0.9 6.92005E-97  0.32 0.7 6.61045E-32  0.4 0.9 1.57688E-10 
0.3 0.1 6.81111E-40  0.32 0.9 7.6844E-32  0.5 0.1 0.07774752 
0.3 0.3 8.83614E-40  0.34 0.1 1.55545E-25  0.5 0.5 0.287837527 
0.3 0.5 1.08612E-39  0.34 0.3 2.08542E-25  0.5 0.9 0.497927535 
0.3 0.7 1.28862E-39  0.34 0.5 2.6154E-25  0.7 0.1 0.1 
0.3 0.9 1.49112E-39  0.34 0.7 3.14538E-25  0.7 0.5 0.5 
0.31 0.1 6.56321E-36  0.34 0.9 3.67535E-25  0.7 0.9 0.9 
0.31 0.3 8.57595E-36  0.35 0.1 1.45276E-22  0.9 0.1 0.1 
0.31 0.5 1.05887E-35  0.35 0.3 1.96793E-22  0.9 0.5 0.5 
0.31 0.7 1.26014E-35  0.35 0.5 2.4831E-22  0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
In this subsection, it was shown that there are equilibria with cooperation both in pure and 
mixed strategies in the case of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo. This means that even when some 
of the mothers were allowed to have some probability of participating in group activities, there 
are plausible conditions (shown in the simulations) in which high risk is combined with 
participation for rational individuals. Hence, it was shown that the Mothers acted rationally in 
risking their lives for their cause. 
 
4.3. Equilibria without state repression 
In Section 4.2 the cost of participating (c) reflects the fact that the government always 
represses the group. What would happen if the government did not repress? A reduction of c 
enlarges the gains from participating and thus diminishes the incentives for free riding. As c → 
0, the expected payoff of participating becomes Pr{Mp ≥ τ}(1 + s) and the expected payoff of 
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not participating approaches Pr{Mp ≥ τ}. Thus, a rational player will participate. This may 
explain why the group grew stronger with the end of the dictatorship. 
However, the emergence of democracy changed the incentive scheme significantly. Once 
repression ended, information was readily available; both national and international bodies 
investigated abuses of human rights. In terms of our formal analysis, this implies that one of 
the components of the selective incentives (the information that the mothers secretly passed on 
one another at the Plaza (d)) became a non-excludable public good. The purposive (p) and 
solidary (o) benefits remained excludable goods. 
Nevertheless, more mothers joined the group. In turn, increased membership was followed 
by the split of the group into two organizations. In 1983, democratically elected president Raul 
Alfonsin addressed the issue of the disappeared through: (1) the appointment of a commission 
of investigation (CONADEP), which produced the report Nunca Masand (2) the trial of the 
Junta. By the end of 1986, the government enacted the Full Stop Law and in the beginning of 
1987, the Due Obedience Law (Bouvard 1994: 158). Both were aimed at providing a statute of 
limitations on the military trials, probably a compromise between the government and the 
armed forces in order to prevent military insurgence. 
The position to be adopted by the Mothers in face of these political developments was 
highly controversial within the group. In the beginning 1986, three years after the return of 
democracy to Argentina, a group of mothers separated from the original organization 
Asociación de Madres de Plaza de Mayo and founded Madres de Plaza de Mayo Linea 
Fundadora. According to those mothers conforming the new organization, the reasons for the 
split were threefold. First, Linea Fundadora supported a more moderate position in tone with a 
constitutional order. Second, they supported the exhumations and the scientific identification 
of human remnants, while the Asociación believed that that was a recognition of the death of 
the disappeared, which would weaken their demands in regard to the search and punishment of 
those responsible of the disappearances (Mellibovsky 1990: 191). Third, they did not perceive 
that a democratic spirit reigned in the leadership of the organization. According to the MFL: 
“The split of the movement occurred after having confronted together the worst years of 
dictatorship. It was motivated by serious differences in relation to a necessary change in the 
methodology of our fight under a constitutional government and due to deep discrepancies in 
face of the advancement of an increasing and unacceptable authoritarian attitude with marked 
personal tone, which impede a democratic conception of the cohabitation inside our 
organization and in relation to the other organizations of the human rights movement. The 
implementation of policies more and more dictatorial, disqualifying and defamatory led to the 
irremediable rupture.” (MLF web site, my translation)11 
The version of the mothers in the Asociación de Madres de Plaza de Mayo, from a 
compilation of testimonies that can be found in Diago (1998: 193), is that those mothers who 
left the group did so because of the fact that they perceived that they would not win the election 
within the organization. On January 17th of 1986, the group of mothers who later formed Linea 
Fundadora presented the “yellow” list for the internal elections of the Asociación de Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo, but while votes were cast, they decided to abandon the election claiming 
technical flaws in the process.12 
We can reasonably interpret that the split was due to a mix of a power struggle and concrete 
differences in terms of what steps the organization ought to take in a democratic scenario. 
                                                     
11 MLF web site, Document: “Respecto a la identidad de Madres de Plaza de Mayo Línea Fundadora”. 
12 They argued that the Budget and the Memoir had not been presented exactly 15 days prior to the election.  
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Nevertheless, it is not relevant in this analysis what share of the explanation each of these 
factors accounted for. Although it is true that the split occurred under democracy because 
differences between the Mothers arose then, a break up was unlikely under the military regime. 
Differences between the mothers already existed when they started meeting (see testimonies in 
Diago 1988:191-196). For example, the positions towards the Catholic Church and personal 
political orientation marked differences between them even before the return to democracy, 
although the institution took no official position. These internal differences were not new. What 
was a novelty was that, with guaranteed constitutional rights, the cost of joining the group 
approached zero and there was no need to act cohesively in defensive activities. 
5. Encapsulated-interest theory of trust 
I argue that the kind of behavior described in the above paragraphs was exactly what made 
the Mothers rational. This falls into the definition of encapsulated trust, referring to mutual trust 
relations between each pair of mothers within the group, or at least the core group (the 
organizers able to mobilize and coordinate the rest). 
According to Hardin, encapsulated interest is among the top reasons for considering 
someone to be trustworthy: 
“Note that our merely having the same interests with respect to some matter does not meet 
the condition of trust as encapsulated interest, although it can often give me reason to expect 
you to do what I would want you to do or what would serve my interests (because it 
simultaneously serves yours). The encapsulated-interest account does entail that the truster and 
the trusted have compatible interest over at least some matters, but such incentive compatibility, 
while necessary, is not sufficient for that account, which further requires that the trusted values 
the continuation of the relationship with the truster and has compatible interests at least in part 
for this reason.” (Hardin 2004: 7, italics in the original). 
Thus, trusting each other over their own physical security was both the core cost and the 
core benefit of joining the group, given that we know through testimonies that the intensity of 
the preference of those mothers interested in finding out about the whereabouts of their children 
was very strong. That was the safety net that made any joint action possible, as the actions of 
the mothers described above show. When everybody was calling them madwomen, they were 
in fact maximizing their utility under high risk conditions and being more effective in voicing 
their demands. 
Now consider the situation of the Mothers towards the times in which the first 
“disappearances” took place. At the beginning of the process, the mothers (according to their 
own testimonies) were naively hoping to capture General Videla’s attention and eventually 
receive favourable answers from him (see Section 2). They obviously did not have information 
on what type of dictator he was and how willing he was to kill civilians. This lack of information 
facilitated the first gatherings between the mothers. Given the information available to them, 
they rated a lower risk than the one that they were really facing and rationally decided to 
organize. I would say that they made a rational choice with incorrect beliefs. The risk was also 
affected by the fact that at the beginning the Mothers were not completely aware of the fact that 
the whole regime was behind the “disappearances” and that those “disappeared” were actually 
killed. They went through a learning process: how to be secretive about future places to meet, 
how to avoid police repression, etc.  
Note that the type of interaction proposed involved trusting people known to you. Let us 
remember that the mothers did not exchange any information on their last names, addresses or 
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phone numbers at the beginnings (later on we could think of a repeated game structure). This 
consideration introduces a second type of risk: that of including in the set of trust relations the 
wrong people. Again, the government would be behind this, but now in a different manner: 
spies could be sent to infiltrate in the group. Indeed, failing to gather hints about the true type 
of new members led to the “disappearance” of Azucena on Dec. 10th 1977. From then on, the 
mothers started to be very careful as to who was accepted in the group.  
On the side of the benefits, we counted the possibility of having a forum in which to talk 
and feel understood (developed in Section 1), a safety net to protect each other’s lives (referred 
to in the last paragraph), the possibility of finding a more effective way to gather information 
on the “disappeared” than doing it alone, a social network of information for various purposes, 
the satisfaction of doing something for their children, and the feeling of belonging to a group 
of “equals” in respect to the situation they were living. We should make a note at this point. We 
have shown through the mother’s testimonies that one of the main reasons that drove them to 
participate in the activities of the group was the fact that they had a shared concern for their 
missing children. Nevertheless, we are aware that this fact does not meet the condition of trust 
as encapsulated interest (Hardin 2002: 4). This makes our argument even stronger, because as 
this is not required in the definition of trust under analysis, the reason we consider determinant 
of trust relations of this type can be isolated: the risk of being killed or harmed, “I protect my 
life when I protect our life.” Note that this case is notoriously different from other situations in 
which you assess another member of your community as trustworthy because you are certain 
that you will repeatedly encounter her in future interactions. You are able to anticipate that it is 
in her interest to act in your interest in the interactions you both have because if she deceives 
you, she is likely to be excluded from the group and therefore lose the benefits of membership 
(e. g. mafia groups, religious sects, etc.) 
We have so far analyzed the costs and benefits involved in joining the group, provided that 
it is organized and trust relations are such that collective action is supported, and more 
importantly, provided that the probability of going missing was in fact a decreasing function of 
trust relations (the stronger the trust relation, the more controlled the risk), we are left with the 
task of showing the rationality of the 14 first mothers. An easy way to account for it would be 
to state that their passion overturned their rationality, and it turned out all right in the end. This 
is, nevertheless, not a satisfactory answer in terms of our theoretical framework, but more 
importantly, we would not be explaining rationality. The best way to explain their rationality is 
to analyze the problem they faced in light of the concept of common sense epistemology “[...] 
When we face a decision, we are stuck to a variably large extent with the prior knowledge. We 
may act rationally from the perspective of our available knowledge even though, with more 
time to work out the facts, we might retrospectively conclude that our action was not in our 
interest. It would be odd, however, to conclude that the action was irrational when taken if it 
was fully rational given the available information” (Hardin 1995: 16).  
 
6. Conclusions 
We explored the circumstances under which trust relations emerged in the case of the 
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and found two important moments: (1) when the group was 
spontaneously created, where uncertainty led to an underestimation of risk and (2) when the 
risk was high but the group was already up and running, and new members faced the decision 
of whether to join or not. This case offers very special conditions since the cost of joining group 
activities was extremely high, endangering the physical well-being of participants in collective 
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action. The mothers organized and were able to survive the dictatorship, making individual 
rational choices consistent with collective objectives.  
A very simple step public goods model was developed in the preceding pages. The results 
of such exercise showed that cooperation was supported in equilibrium in the stage game both 
in pure and in mixed strategies. These results were unchanged when analyzing the effect of a 
reduction of the cost of participation. We found that even when the incentive scheme changed, 
it did not alter the predictions of the model. The results helped us support formally the outcome 
observed: the problem of the free-rider was overcome due to selective incentives. Additionally, 
the evidence showed that selective incentives came before the group was well functioning, since 
the first mothers who gathered at the Plaza benefitted from each other´s moral support. 
We investigated the split of the organization with the democratic transition and made a 
counterfactual argument in order to explore the effect of a drastic decrease of risk on trust 
relations. We posed that such impact led to a situation in which each other’s life ceases to be 
the object of trust and allowed the revelation of more sophisticated preferences relative to those 
found under higher levels of risk (where the only thing that mattered was to preserve your life). 
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